Judicial Defiance: When Lower Courts Challenge the Supreme Court's Authority

Since the start of President Trump’s second term, much debate has centered on the possibility of presidential defiance against court rulings.

As concrete instances of outright violations by the administration proved scarce or disputable, some observers expanded the definition of defiance to include so-called malicious compliance—where court orders are followed in form but circumvented in spirit, often through bad faith.

This issue remains relevant today but has taken a new direction: defiance emerging within the judiciary itself. Lower courts, including district and appellate judges, have either openly disobeyed Supreme Court orders or engaged in evasive compliance tactics that blatantly disregard the court’s authority.

Over the past decade, judicial overreach has increasingly undermined the constitutional balance by restricting the executive branch’s capacity to carry out policies enacted by elected officials. This challenge has affected administrations from both major parties and risks provoking drastic measures to reestablish order. The current wave of judicial defiance threatens to erode the judiciary’s own internal cohesion, which depends on lower courts adhering to Supreme Court directives.

Take the example of Judge Brian Murphy from the Federal District Court in Massachusetts. He issued a preliminary injunction blocking the transfer of certain removable aliens to third countries—a practice explicitly allowed by federal law. This was a clear case of judicial overreach.

However, when the Supreme Court ordered a stay of this injunction pending ongoing litigation, Judge Murphy defied that stay by maintaining his initial order, citing solely the dissenting opinion of Justice Sonia Sotomayor as justification. This action appeared to be a deliberate act of bad faith. The Supreme Court, with Justice Elena Kagan concurring, subsequently had to intervene again to halt this renewed defiance.

Similarly, a Federal District Court judge in Oregon ruled against the Department of Homeland Security’s mass termination of parole status for certain migrants, referencing prior lower-court rulings that had blocked comparable executive actions. Crucially, this judge omitted the fact that the Supreme Court had already stayed those earlier rulings.

These incidents are not isolated. For instance, in Trump v. Wilcox, the Supreme Court stayed injunctions from the Federal District Court in Washington that sought to prevent the president from removing members of the National Labor Relations Board and the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Court underscored that these agencies wield significant executive authority, and thus the president’s removal powers cannot be restricted under current law. Yet, a Fourth Circuit panel recently refused to stay a District Court order blocking presidential removal of members from the Consumer Product Safety Commission, an agency with comparable legal standing.

The Supreme Court again granted a stay, reaffirming that its prior ruling in Trump v. Wilcox governs such cases and that lower courts should align their equitable discretion accordingly. Despite clear Supreme Court guidance, some lower courts continue to disregard these rulings.

In United States v. Shilling, the Supreme Court was compelled to stay a District Court’s order that blocked the Defense Department’s policy excluding transgender individuals from military service. This District Court’s ruling teetered between outright defiance and bad-faith evasion, particularly since the Supreme Court had already permitted a similar policy during the previous administration.

Another example involves government contracts and funding. The Supreme Court clarified in Department of Education v. California that disputes over contract terminations fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims, not standard federal courts. Nonetheless, a District Court in New York issued an order preventing contract terminations by the Labor Department, ignoring this precedent.

Several factors contribute to these patterns. Plaintiffs—often activist groups—strategically file cases in districts with ideologically sympathetic judges, a tactic known as forum or judge shopping. This practice has been sharply criticized by liberal voices under the current administration.

Notably, recent incidents of lower-court defiance have clustered in specific regions, such as the Federal District Courts in the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Northern California, and Maryland—areas with a predominantly liberal judiciary. Conversely, under President Biden, conservative states like Texas have similarly leveraged their courts for favorable outcomes.

District Court judges operate with minimal accountability, functioning almost like autonomous authorities within their jurisdictions. Even if reversed on appeal, their orders can delay presidential policies for significant periods, effectively obstructing executive action.

There is a persistent temptation among some lower-court judges to make ideologically driven rulings that garner public and academic praise, despite risking damage to the judiciary’s overall credibility. For example, Judge Charles Breyer’s attempt to regulate presidential deployment of the National Guard was so extreme it was promptly stayed by an appellate court.

What distinguishes these acts is not mere grandstanding but a direct challenge to the Supreme Court’s authority. The federal judiciary as a whole suffers from a collective-action dilemma: the institution’s reputation is harmed by such defiance, while individual judges gain ideological acclaim.

Proposals for structural reform, such as reinstating three-judge District Courts for specific cases, are often suggested but face significant hurdles due to lack of congressional consensus. Moreover, such reforms do not address the immediate problem of presidential policies being blocked by judges acting against not only the law but the Supreme Court’s rulings.

The Supreme Court has recently limited the use of universal injunctions, notably in Trump v. CASA, but this only partially mitigates the issue. The ruling does not apply to many cases under the Administrative Procedure Act, and some lower courts have circumvented its effects by certifying overly broad class-action lawsuits. The ideal of a ‘normal appellate process’ is compromised when lower courts ignore or evade Supreme Court orders, making comprehensive judicial review impractical and delaying executive governance.

A controversial last resort, rooted in constitutional theory and known as 'departmentalism,' permits the president to disregard judicial orders that exceed judicial authority, based on the president’s independent interpretation of the law. This principle applies, for example, if a court attempted to prevent the president from exercising constitutional powers such as pardons or vetoes. Constitutional scholars have noted this concept’s deep historical roots.

Alexander Hamilton discussed this mechanism in the Federalist Papers as a vital check within the system of separated powers.

While departmentalism is contentious and risks unintended consequences, its application here is especially compelling. When a lower court’s order not only limits executive authority but also openly defies the Supreme Court, the conflict is less about inter-branch tension and more about upholding the judicial hierarchy.

By rejecting such insubordinate lower-court orders, the president would, in fact, be reinforcing the Supreme Court’s constitutional authority—the only court explicitly established by the Constitution.