The CIA’s Struggles to Redefine Its Role in the Post-Cold War Era

On the evening of June 21, President Trump announced on national television that a covert operation targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities had been successfully executed. He declared, “Tonight, I can report to the world that the strikes were a spectacular military success,” claiming the sites were “completely and totally obliterated.”

However, this confident assertion was quickly challenged by an initial analysis from the Defense Intelligence Agency, which indicated that the damage was limited and would likely delay Iran’s nuclear program by only a few months. Despite this, the president maintained his position, asserting that further evaluations would validate his statement. Shortly thereafter, the CIA director at the time, John Ratcliffe, disputed the DIA’s findings, citing “new intelligence” from an undisclosed source that confirmed the facilities were “severely damaged,” a term slightly less emphatic than the president’s but still supportive of the narrative.

The true impact on the ground remains unclear, but these conflicting reports have underscored concerns about the increasing politicization of America’s leading intelligence agency.

In his latest book, “The Mission,” investigative journalist Tim Weiner chronicles the series of challenges and miscalculations that have marked the CIA’s trajectory since the Cold War. Known for his extensive coverage of American intelligence, Weiner previously earned a National Book Award for “Legacy of Ashes,” which detailed the agency’s first fifty years. “The Mission” picks up the story beyond the Cold War’s end, offering a deeply researched but occasionally unwieldy account of the agency’s evolving role.

The narrative begins in the 1990s, a period when the CIA struggled to redefine its purpose after the Cold War’s conclusion. The agency took on supporting roles in the drug war and, following the September 11 attacks, shifted focus to the war on terror. Operatives pursued Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and engaged in controversial interrogation practices aimed at extracting intelligence on future threats. Much of this information, according to Weiner, was obtained by a rapidly assembled cadre of often inexperienced interrogators. One former CIA official involved in these operations acknowledged to Weiner, “If people thought we did something illegal, something immoral, we’ll live with it. I’ll live with it.”