Xi Jinping's Purge of Allies Echoes Historical Patterns of Stalin and Mao

Unlike the open political contests familiar in the United States, where conflicts between top politicians and wealthy business leaders unfold publicly through social media and speeches, China operates in stark contrast with its opaque political maneuvers.

The Chinese public remains largely in the dark about pivotal moments such as the abrupt removal of former President Hu Jintao from the 2022 Communist Party Congress or the circumstances surrounding former Premier Li Keqiang's death in 2023. Decades later, the full story of Lin Biao, Mao Zedong's chosen successor who fled China and died in a 1971 plane crash, is still unknown.

This secrecy has given rise to an industry of dedicated online commentators who meticulously analyze rumors and subtle signs for hints of political shifts. Their videos dissect everything from Xi Jinping’s gait and appearance to his media presence, attracting millions of views beyond China's internet firewall.

This summer has been particularly intense for these political sleuths. Xi Jinping has purged numerous military and political leaders, many of whom were once his own appointees. These commentators have pieced together timelines of Xi’s potential ousting, fierce factional disputes within the party’s senior leadership, and even alleged military plots against him. Voices from abroad have speculated about fractures within China’s power structure, prompting risk analysts and investment firms to question whether Xi’s moves signal strength or vulnerability.

China’s political landscape remains an enigma, with few credible observers willing to endorse rumors fully. Yet the questions raised are legitimate and carry deep historical resonance.

Xi Jinping’s purges draw heavily on traditions established by Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, serving to discipline elites and consolidate the absolute authority of a single leader. Having been at the helm for over a decade, Xi’s campaign underscores the immense challenge of managing a sprawling political system, even for a leader with seemingly unrivaled power. The surge in rumor mongering may reflect growing tensions between Xi and the Communist Party elite.

During the 1930s, Stalin’s Great Purge eliminated 70 percent of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and over half of the 1,966 delegates at its 1934 congress. Large segments of the Soviet military leadership were executed.

Stephen Kotkin, a historian and biographer of Stalin, has remarked that communism’s paradox lies in its tendency to target even its most loyal followers, driven by paranoia and extreme measures.

Nearly a century later, Xi’s campaign is neither as bloody nor as sweeping but is the most extensive since Mao’s Cultural Revolution, during which Mao sidelined or destroyed most of his top lieutenants, including Deng Xiaoping and Xi Jinping’s own father, Xi Zhongxun.

In 2024, the Communist Party disciplined 889,000 members, including 73 at provincial or ministerial levels or above, according to official figures. Since late 2022, about 10 percent of the party’s Central Committee—the highest decision-making body—has been purged, marginalized, or conspicuously absent from key meetings, estimates political analyst Wu Guoguang.

The military has been disproportionately affected. At least 45 officers in the People’s Liberation Army and China’s military-industrial complex have been removed since 2023, according to the Jamestown Foundation. In 2024 alone, two defense ministers were charged with corruption and acts tantamount to betrayal of Xi.

All this followed Xi’s securing a third term in 2022 and filling leadership ranks with his allies. Yet the purges continue unabated.

Paranoia plays a significant role. In authoritarian regimes, control over military and security forces is existential, but even loyalists develop their own interests and networks, posing risks to the leader. Xi faces the daunting task of managing a vast system that far exceeds the reach of his personal network, necessitating reorganizations, purges, and the manipulation of rivalries within the party.

Kotkin clarifies that this is not about Xi having ‘problems’ but rather the inherent difficulties anyone would face in governing such an expansive system.

Wu from Stanford identifies a recurring cycle in Stalin, Mao, and now Xi: political purges follow governance failures and further centralize power. Stalin’s Great Purge came after a devastating famine his policies helped cause. Mao’s Cultural Revolution followed China’s Great Famine, a consequence of his disastrous decisions. Xi’s current campaign follows setbacks from zero-COVID policies, regressive economic measures, and contentious foreign policy moves.

Wu describes a self-reinforcing spiral between highly centralized power and governance disasters, with purges being the critical link that tightens a dictator’s control amid failures.

A key difference between Stalin’s and Xi’s rule is public perception. During Stalin’s era, most Russians, out of fear or conviction, believed he was protecting their country and communism. The same was largely true under Mao, but this faith appears absent in Xi’s China.

No one predicts the collapse of Xi’s government, but speculation about his grip on power may signal rising tensions within the Communist Party elite.

Party elites tolerated Xi’s power consolidation through anti-corruption campaigns, constitutional changes removing term limits, and crackdowns on the private sector because their privileges remained intact, according to Cai Xia, a retired professor and party critic. But now, with the purges intensifying and economic troubles mounting, the stakes have become more personal.

‘If this continues, the party elites might begin to fear it is not Xi who will fall, but the party itself,’ Cai warns.

Xi could remain in power for another decade or two, health permitting, but only if he retains the loyalty of party leaders. Kotkin highlights that one of the regime’s greatest vulnerabilities emerges when elites start doubting their leader.

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency appears to recognize potential fractures within China’s elite and has sought to exploit them, releasing Mandarin-language recruitment videos targeting Chinese officials as recently as May.

One fictional party official in the recruitment video reflects on witnessing the sudden disgrace of superiors and realizing his own precarious fate.

While recruitment may not be the central issue, the message seeks to underscore perceived disaffection within the party ranks.

It remains uncertain how effective Xi’s purges will be, and no end is currently in sight.

Wu notes that Xi’s new totalitarian model clashes with the patronage-based capitalism favored by previous leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, a conflict unlikely to be resolved by simply replacing thousands of party officials.