Antony Blinken Critiques Trump’s Iran Strike While Hoping for Its Success

The recent U.S. strike targeting three Iranian nuclear sites was, in my assessment, an ill-advised and unnecessary action. Nevertheless, now that it has taken place, I sincerely hope it has been effective.

This presents a dilemma shared by many former officials, myself included, who have dealt extensively with the Iran nuclear challenge. Our collective goal has been to prevent Iran from ever developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon. Even without nuclear capabilities, Iran remains a significant threat: it is a principal state sponsor of terrorism, a disruptive force through its proxies across Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, Yemen, and Iraq, and an existential danger to Israel. The acquisition of nuclear weapons would only embolden Tehran to act with even greater recklessness in these areas.

So why do I consider the strike a miscalculation?

Firstly, such a confrontation should have been avoidable. In 2015, the Obama administration, alongside Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China, and the European Union, successfully negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. This agreement effectively placed Iran’s fissile material program—the essential fuel for nuclear arms—under strict containment and monitoring. The JCPOA extended Iran’s 'breakout time,' or the time required to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear bomb, to at least one year. Should Iran breach or decline to renew the accord after 15 years, the international community would be alerted well in advance, allowing ample time for a measured response, including military options if necessary.

In 2018, however, the Trump administration abandoned the deal without offering a replacement, prompting Iran to accelerate uranium enrichment. This likely shortened its breakout time to just days or weeks. Essentially, the current administration is attempting to extinguish a blaze it helped ignite.

Secondly, while fissile material is a prerequisite for nuclear weapons, it alone does not constitute a functional bomb. An explosive device is also required. Intelligence assessments, despite some mixed signals from within the previous administration, indicate Iran has not yet committed to weaponization. Estimates suggest that if Tehran chooses to proceed, it would require 18 to 24 months to develop a viable explosive device. This indicates that diplomatic avenues still had time to be explored and that the threat was not as immediate as portrayed.

Thirdly, experts I consulted expressed skepticism regarding the capability of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP)—the 30,000-pound bombs used in the strike—to completely neutralize the Fordow facility and other deeply buried or reinforced elements of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Early reports confirm significant damage but not total destruction.